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tion of Woolworth, significantly reveals Maryland's future posture in
the area of respondeat superior. The absolute liability of the master
seems to be an inevitable result.

Barry Genkin

CRIMINAL LAW-JUDICIAL AFFIRMANCE OF THE VALIDITY
OF THE YEAR AND A DAY RULE IN MARYLAND. STATE V.
BROWN, 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974).
A mortal wound rarely claiJDs its victim more than a year after the
fatal infliction. The common law established the rule that, in order to
constitute felonious homicide, death of the victim must occur within a
year and a day after the fatal act.
In State v. Brown,l a case of first impression, the Court of Special
Appeals addressed itself to the applicability of the year and a day rule
in Maryland. The appellee was indicted for the murder of his wife. It .
was not disputed that the decedent, who lingered almost two years
before she died, was injured by the appellee.2 The Criminal Court of
Baltimore, in granting the appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment,
found the year and a day rule to be valid and viable in Maryland. Upon
appeal by the State, the Court of Special Appeals, in affirming the trial
court's decision, held that the year and a day rule is in "full force and .
effect in Maryland.,,3 Although the Brown court recognized the advancements made by medical science, it was not prepared to conclude
that the rule is presently anachronistic.4 Adjudging any alteration of
the rule by judicial discretion inappropriate, the court reasoned that if
change in the rule was to occur, it should be by the General Assembly.s
The rule is not intended to be a statute of limitations on an
indictment for felonious homicide.6 It is a test of proXimate causation
1. 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974).
2. Appellee had. pleaded guilty to assault with intent to murder and was subsequently sentenced to a six-year prison term notwithstanding the fact that the State had recommended a five-year sentence. Brief for Appellant at 2.
3. 21 Md. App. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261. The State, in its brief, had not disputed the validity
of the common law rule in Maryland but had urged abrogation of the rule. Brief for
Appellant at 2.
.
4. Id. See also notes 63-65 infra.
5. Id. See also note 62 infra.
6. A statute of limitations connotes the time in which a prosecution can be brought after
the completion of the crime, which, in the case or'murder, does not commence until the
death of the victim. Because the overwhelming majority of states do not limit prosecution
for murder, prosecution may be brought at any time during the life of the offender. See,
e.g., GAo CODE ANN. § 26-502 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106(1) (Supp. 1972).
Contra, N.M .. STAT. ANN. § 4OA-I-8 (1953), no person shall be prosecuted for a capital
felony unless an indictment can be found, information or complaint filed within ten years
from the time the crime is committed. A number of states do limit the prosecution period
for felonies other than murder. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.11 (1974), prosecution for
all felonies other than aggravated murder or murder is barred unless commenced within
six years after the offense.
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which concludes that "if [the victim] died after [a year and a"day] it
cannot be discerned, as the law presumes, whether he died of the stroke
or poison, etc., or a natural death, and in the case of life, the law ought
to be certain.,,7 The rule created arbitrary settlement for the difficult
question of proof of physical causation. The difficulty of proof was
attributed to two factors. First, at early common law, the science of
medicine was relatively primitive, not having advanced to the point
where death from a particular cause could be conclusively determined.
Second, the testimony of expert witnesses was unknown to the trier of
facts in the early English courts. 8 The jury could only base its determination of causation upon the conclusions of fact and persuasive
assertions. 9 One of the more arbitrary features of the rule was the
tacking on of an additional day to the year. The early English law gave
no recognition to fractions of days; a day was conveniently added so
that a whole year would have elapsed after the fatal stroke. 1 0
Three forms of actions dealing with murder and manslaughter existed
at common law. 1 1 An important element in each form of action was
death "within a year and a day. The earliest mentioned action within
English common law appears to be the "appeals of death."1 2 Essentially a private prosecution for the punishment of public crimes, the
action placed the feud in the hands of the male nearest in blood to the
decedent. 1 3 The action provided that if the victim died within a year
and a day after the assault, the "appeal of death" should not be
abated. 1 4 Reasoning that personal vengence should be promptly ex7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

3 E. COKE, INSTlTtJ'I"FJI 53 (2d ed. 1648) [hereinaftet cited as COKE).
10 WISC. L. REV. 112, 113 (1934).
J. THAYER, EVIDENCE 174 (1898).
3 COKE 53.
See Louisville, E. & St. L. RR v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894) for a full analysis of the
three forms of action in early English common law dealing with murder and manslaughter.
See also Brown v. State, 21 Md. App. 91, 94 n.4, 318 A.2d 257, 25!Hi0 n.4, and in particular
the second paragraph where the court recites other aspects of ancient law where the
limitation appeared.
12. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *312-13 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE1 described
the origin of appeals of death as a Germanic custom by which pecuniary satisfaction·was
paid to the injured party or his relatives by the assailant. See also 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 39 (Milson ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK
& MAITLAND).
13. 4 BLACKSTONE *312-13.
14. Statute of Glouchester of 1278, 6 Edw. I, c. 9:
The King commandeth that no Writ shall be granted out of the Chancery for
the Death of a Man to enquire whether a Man did kill another by Misfortune, or
in his own Defence, or in other Manner without Felony; (2) but he shall be put in
Prison until the coming of the Justices in Eyre, or Justices assigned to the Goaldelivery, and shall put himself"upon the County before them for Good and Evil:
(3) In case it be found by the Country, that he did it in his Defence, or by Misfortune, then by the Report of the Justices to the King, the King shall take him
to his Grace, if it piease him. (4) It is provided also, that no Appeal shall be abated
so soon as they have been heretofore; but if the Appellor declare the Deed. the
Year, the Day, the Hours, the Time of the King, and the Town where the Deed
was done and with what Weapon he was slain, the Appeal shall stand in Effect,
(5) and shall not be abated for Default of fresh Suit, if the Party shall sue within the
Year and aDay after the Deed done.
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ecuted, the statute was misinterpreted as requiring that the private
appeal be initiated within a year and a day after the victim's death and
not after infliction of the mortal wound. Thus, the statute was, in
effect, one of limitation. 1 5 Albeit, through transition or ignorance, the
year and a day limitation evolved from its origins in private appeal
prosecutions into a substantial element of criminal homicide. 1 6
A second method, "inquisitions against deodands," like "appeals of
death," was essentially a criminal action even though civil in some
procedural aspects. It was an action of· forfeiture, whereby the party.
committing the injury forfeited to the king personal chattels used in
making his assault. 1 7 The forfeited chattels were to be applied to pious
uses including the distributioJl of alms.18 However, if the assaulted
party lingered more than a year and a day, there arose a conclusive
presumption that death had resulted from an independent cause precluding institution of the forfeiture action. 1 9
The advent of "public prosecution" established the foundations for
the third form of action. Brought in the name of, and on behalf of, the
king, the action recognized that criminal offenses were essentially
indignities against the public peace, not personal wrongs against the
victim.20 As modem criminal prosecution evolved, the "appeal of
death" disappeared.2 1 Thus, the rule that no one could be held responsible for a felonious homicide when more than a year and a day elapsed
between infliction of the mortal wound and death was fmnly settled in
the common law of England. 2 2
.The rule was eventually adopted in the United States. With only two

15. The confusion as to whether the time was to run from the date of the blow or from the
date of the victim's death was witnessed in Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 631 (King's Bench
1558). The court's holding that the time ran from the date of death has served as a primary
authority that the rule was by nature a limitation. See also 4 BLACKSTONE ·315.
16. See 19 CHI.·KENT L. REV. 181 (1941) for an exhaustive treatment of the transition of the
statute from a form of limitation to an element of criminal homicide.
17. 1. BLACKSTONE ·300. The concept was derived from the legal fiction that the inanimate object used in making the assault was guilty of a wrong doing. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 473. A
contemporary analogy will be found in automobile forfeiture statutes which authorize con·
fiscation by the state of motor vehicles used to transport or conceal narcotics. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 'l:l § 297 (1970). See generally 3 U. BALT. L. REV. 270 (1974).
18. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 474. This original charitable purpOlle was eventually abused when
the king granted the properties 80 obtained to his favorites. 1 BLACKSTONE ·301.
19. 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 75-76 (8th Curwood ed. 1824). The inquisitions
against deodands were abolished by statute in England in 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 62.
(1846).
20. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 256-57 (4th ed. 1936).
21. The appeal was abolished by statute in England in 1819, 39 Geo. m. c. 46, and never
existed as a method of trial in the United States.
22. Louisville, E. St. L. R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894) (dictum); Commonwealth v.
Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 175, 166 A.2d 501,507 (1960) (concurring opinion); 3 COKE 47. Though
usually' phrased in terms of murder, the common law rule was reasserted to apply with
equal force to manslaughter. Rex v. Dyson, (1908) 2 K.B. 254; cf. Commonwealth v.
Evaul, 5 Pa. D. & C. 105 (Phil. Co. Ct. 1924) (rule does not apply to involuntary manslaugh·
ter) ..
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exceptions,23 those courts which have considered the question have
detennined that the rule prevails.24 Although acknowledging the rule's
existence, the decisions of those same courts occasioned sharp judicial
conflict as to the precise nature of the rule. The struggle centered on
whether the rule was substantive or evidentiary in nature. 2S Those
jurisdictions treating the rule as evidentiary conclusively presumed that
if a year and a day elapsed prior to death; it resulted from other causes
and no evidence was admissible. 26 Those jurisdictions fmding the rule
to be substantive reasoned that no felonious homicide was chargeable if
death failed to occur within the time proscribed by the rule. 2 7 Notwithstanding the fact that the rule was approached by two different
avenues of thought, every jurisdiction, with the two exceptions stated
above, reached the conclusion that the rule was valid. 28
The fIrSt judicial exception occurred in People v. Legeri, 2 9 a 1933
lower court decision in New York. The Legeri court held that, while the
rule was a substantive element of common law felonious homicide, the
New York Penal Law and Code had implicitly abrogated all common
law crimes. 30 In its stead, the New York Penal Law and Code was to
serve as a complete compjJation and definition of all crimes. Since no
reference to the year and a day rule was included in the statutory
definition of murder, the court concluded that the intention of the
legislature was the abolition of the rule. 31 The Legeri court further
23. People,v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934); People v. Legeri, 239 App. Div.
47,266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1961).
24. See, e.g., Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); State v. Dailey, 191 Ind.
678, 134 N.E. 481 (1922); Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959). See
generally Annot., 93 A.L.R 1470 (1934); Annot., 20 A.L.R 1006 (1922).
25. The procedural view was essentially discarded. See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 140 U.S.
118 (1890), an indictment, failing to show that the date of death oc~d within a year
and a day, was no longer fatally defective if brought within that time. But ct. State v.
Spadoni, 137 Wash. 684, 243 P. 854 (1926). As to where silence is not deemed a fault see
People '1. Murphy, 39 Cal. 52 (1870), rule is evidentiary, not proced\lll!l; Smith v. State,
72 Fla. 449, 73 So. 354 (1916), objection coming after the trial was too· late; Jane v. Commonwealth, 60 Ky. Rep. (3 Met.) 18 (1860),. allegation of death regarded as unnecessary.
It should be noted that in many cases which discuss the evidentiary or substantive nature of the rule, the issue actually before the court was whether or not the State's indictment sufficiently stated a cause of action. Debate on the nature of the rule was mere
dictum.
26. See, e.g., Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894) (dictum); People v.
Murphy, 39 Cal. 52 (1870); Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); State
v. Heff, 11 Nev. 17 (1876).
27. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 196 La. 617, 199 So. 661 (1940); People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y.
100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934) (dictum); State v. Spadoni, 137 Wash. 684, 243 P. 854 (1926).
28. See note 24 supra. See also Commonwealth v. Macloon, J01 Mass. 1. 100 Am. Dec. 89
(1869); State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. (1 Dev. L.) 139, 17 Am. Dec. 563 (1836); Edmondson v.
State, 41 Tex. 496 (1874).
.
29. 239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933).
30. Id. at 48,266 N.Y.S. at 87.
31. To aid the Legeri court in ascertaining legislative intent, reference was made to statutes
existing prior to the adoption of the NEW YORK PENAL LAW AND CODE which had incorporated the year and a day rule. For e~mple, by the Law of February 14, 1787. ch.
22 (1787] willful killing by poison was deemed premeditated murder. H death did not
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buttressed its decision by noting the inapplicability of the rule in light
of medical advancements. 32 The following year, the New York Court
of Appeals in People v. Brengard 3 3 became the first state court of last
resort to determine that the common law rule was an anachronism. 34
More then twenty-five years elapsed before occurrence of the next
judicial exception. In 1961, Maryland's sister state of Pennsylvania
abolished the rule with its decision in Commonwealth v. Ladd. 3 5 The
court reasoned that if the rule was evidentiary rather than substantive
in nature, it was subject to judicial abolition. 3 6 In reaching its decision,
the Ladd court relied upon Blackstone's definition of murder. "A
felonious homicide occurs when a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully and feloniously kills any human being in the peace of
the sovereign with malice prepense or aforethought. ,,3 7 Blackstone did
not refer to the year and a day rule until two pages later. "In order
also to make the killing murder it is requisite that the party die within a
year and a day after the stroke received or cause of death administered.,,38 The court reasoned that since Blackstone had deliberately
not mentioned the rule until after two intervening pages, Blackstone
did not consider the rule substantive. Finding the rule to be arbitrary
and taking judicial notice of medical advances, the Ladd court saw no
more reason for reading Blackstone's addendum into his substantive
definition of murder than for considering a rule of venue as part of the
substantive definition.39 The rule was evidentiary and thus subject to
judicial abolition.4 0
It was within this historical and judicial context that the court in
State v. Brown4 1 was confronted with the validity and viability of the
ensue within the year and a day under the Law of February lO, 1813, ch. 29 [1813] when
there was an intent to murder by poisoning, punishment could not exceed a 14-year prison
term. The Legeri court reasoned that, since prior statutes had specifically incorporated
the rule, repeal of such statutes in 1828 and the Legislature's subsequent failure to include the rule when enacting the PENAL LAW AND GODE indicated the Legislature's intent
to abrogate the rule. 239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933).
32. 239 App. Div. at 49, 266 N.Y.S. at 88.
33. 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934).
34. For discussion provoked by these cases see, e.g., 10 WISC. L. REV. 112 (1934); 19 MINN.
L. REV. 240 (1935); 19 CORNELL. L. Q. 306 (1934).
35. 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960).
36.Id.
37. 4 BLACKSTONE *195; 402 Pa. at 172, 166 A.2d at 505.
38. 4 BLACKSTONE *197; 402 Pa. at 172, 166 A.2d at 505.
39. 402 Pa. at 172, 166 A.2d at 505-06.
40. In finding the rule to be evidentiary, rather than substantive, the Ladd court relied upon
the dictum of the Supreme Court case of Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230
(1894). The concurring opinion in Ladd, while finding the rule to be part of the substantive
English common law, determined that the rule had never been adopted into PennAylvania's common law. A vigorous dissent attacked the majority's analysis of Blackstone,
found the rule valid in Pennsylvania, and challenged the majority's arbitrary rewriting of
the criminal law as a "despotic untrammeled usurpation of power ... taking away CODstitutional prerogatives ... [and] making a mockery of the law of cause and effect."
402 Pa. at 201, 166 A.2d at 520. The Ladd decision aroused extensive comment and criticism. See, e.g., 65 DICK. L. REv. 166 (1961); 40 N.C. L. REv. 327 (1962); 47 VA. L. REv.
880 (1961).
41. 21 Md. App. 91,318 A.2d 257 (1974).

1974]

Recent Developments

191

year and a day rule in Maryland. The court, after considering the rule's
historical derivation, its apparent arbitrary nature, and the rationale for
its existence, concluded that, "[i) t follows from what we have said
that, although there does not appear to be a case in this jurisdiction
applying the common law rule, we think that it is in full force and
effect· in Maryland.,,4 2 The court relied upon the interpretation of
Maryland's Declaration of Rights:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common
law of England, ... according to the course of that Law, ... as
existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and
seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been
introduced, used and practiced by the Court of Law or
Equity.43
The principle Maryland case construing Article 5 of the Declaration
of Rights was State v. Buchanan, 4 4 where the court interpreted the
Article as supportive of English common law "except such portions of
it as are inconsistent with the spirit of that instrument, and the nature
of our new political institutions.,,4 5 The Brown court, following the
lead of the Criminal Court, did not question the validity of either
condition precedent for adoption of the year and a day rule into the
Maryland common law. 46 The court concluded that the rule "has had
overwhelming support in the United States.'''' 7
Although the Brown court sustained the existence of the rule in
Maryland common law, it discussed the precise nature of the rule only
indirectly. The court simply stated that the "law will not recognize a
homicide'''' 8 when the victim lingers more than a year and a day. While
42. [d. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261. The court said that the rule was promulgated by judicial decisions, but inaccurately cited the Supreme Court case of Louisville, E. & St. L. RR. v.
Clarke, 152 U.S, 230 (1894), as recognizing the rule when in fact recognition occurred only in
dictum. 21 Md. App. at 95, 318 A.2d at 260. The Maryland appellate cases of State v.
Hamilton, 14 Md. App. 582, 587 n.10, 287 A.2d 791, 794 n.10 (1972) and Whitehead v.
State, 9 Md. App. 7, 9 n.2, 262 A.2d 316, 318 n.2 (1970) support the existence of the year
and a day rule in Maryland by way of obiter dictum. 21 Md. App. at 97 n.8, 318 A.2d at
261 n.8.
43. MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 5. Article 5 "appeared fmt as Section m of the
Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of 1776, as Article 3 in the Declaration of Rights
of the Constitution of 1851, and as Article 4 of the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of 1864." Gilbert v. Findlay College, 195 Md. 508, 513, 74 A.2d 36,38 (1950).
44. 5 Har. & J. 317 (1821).
45. [d. at 358. Whether particular parts of the common law are applicable to our local circumstances and political institutions is a question for the courts to decide. [d.
46. On July 4, 1776 the rule existed in England. If an English common law rule did not conflict
with the Maryland Constitution or contemporaneous ooliticai institutions, adoption of the
rule occurred. It should be noted that the State, in its brief, stipulated that the common
law rule was in force il) MarYland. See note 3 supra; ct. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 PL
164, 175-85, 166 A.2d 501, 507-12 (concurring opinion).
.
47. 21 Md. App. at 95, 318 A.2d at 260. While the Maryland appellate courts are under no obligation to follow majority views, neither are they under any obligation to expound a POSItion contrary to that majority which has passed upon an issue. Association of Independent
Taxi Operators, Inc. v. Yellow Cab Co., 198 Md. 181, 204-05,82 A.2d 106, 117 (1951).
48. 21 Md. App. at 92, 318 A.2d at 258. See also id. at 99, 318 A.2d at 262. The implication

192

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 4

the court implied that the rule should be considered a substantive
element of common law felonious homicide rather than an evidentiary
rule, it did not reach a definite conclusion,49 noting that the cases in
other jurisdictions are equally divided in declaring the rule to be
substantive or evidentiary.50
Some advantages flow from the court's failure to articulate a stance
on the rule's precise nature. First, it allows the rule to be both
substantive and evidentiary. The soundest reasoning for this view appears in the recent case of Elliott v. Mills. 5 1 The court, having determined that in a criminal act death within a year and a day must be both
pleaded (by indictment) and proved, termed the rule as both substantive and evidentiary. However, the Elliott court's approach would seem
to suggest that the rule is actually substantive since the court incorporated the rule as an essential element which must be pleaded and
proved.s 2 Second, extended discussion of the nature of the rule may
obscure the principle issue. When a valid common law rule, whether
substantive or evidentiary, has been adopted, the vital controversy
should center on whether authority for abrogation or amendment
properly belongs to the legislature or the judiciary. Such a determination falls into one of the gray areas of law. Indeed, on occasion and
without doing violence to the Constitution, the judiciary may, in its
discretion "legislate;" however, indiscriminate or unjustifiable "judicial
legislation" defies the very nature and purpose of the Constitution.
The decision in the Ladd case illustrates such a misuse of judicial
discretion. The court summarily soncluded that "we may change a
common-law rule of evidence without being guilty of judicial legislation, and abolish it when we are aware that modem conditions have
moved beyond it and left it sterile."5 3 In announcing this conclusion,
the Ladd decision failed to refer to a single case precedent in Pennsylvania indicating that the judiciary has the prerogative to abolish common law rules of evidence.s 4

49.
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.

arises from the court's disagreement with the reasoning of the majority opinion of the
Ladd court 88 to its interpretation of Blackstone and their ultimate conclusion that the
rule is evidentiary, rather than substantive. rd. at 96 n. 7, 318 A.2d at 260-61 n.7.
21 Md. App. at 96, :U8 A.2d at 260.
rd. Whether the rule is evidentiary or substantive the courts subscribe to the view that
alteration of crimina1law, for other than procedural purposes, should be by the legislature.
rd. at 96, 318 A.2d at 2~1.
335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
Cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 616 (1971). Since it is unnecessary to set forth the time of
death on an indictment for murder or manslaughter, it would appear to be unnecessary to
plead directly that the victim died within a year and a day. This would lend further
credence to the belief that the court probably intended to promulgate the common law
rule 88 substantive in nature.
402 PR. at 174, 166 A.2d at 507.
In support of its conclusion that evidentiary rules are subject to judicial abolition, the Ladd
court, quoting from Nesbit v. Riesenman, 298 Pa. 475, 483, 148 A. 695, 697 (1930) stated:
"The function of determining whether a rule of the common law exists, and what it is,
lies \IOlely with the court, 88 does also the question whether given conditions offend that
law." 402 PR. at 174, 166 A.2d at 507. It is suggested that, upon determining what a rule
is and that it exists, a further rmding that given conditions offend the law does not, in and
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The Maryland appellate courts have not clearly delineated when a
common law rule, whether evidentiary or substantive, once adopted in
Maryland may be abrogated or amended. The Buchanan court indicated
that the common law consisted of a system of principles not capable of
expansion. This system was to have perpetual existence, which would
apply to whatever particular matter or circumstances might arise and
come within it. 5 5 Subsequent courts have abandoned such a rigid
attitude. On occasion the courts have held that "the common law is not
static but adapts itself to changing conditions and increasing knowledge.,,56 The courts may implement change via abrogation, revision or
amendment. 5 7 On infrequent occasions the judiciary has exercised its
discretionary powers, but only in civil cases. 5 IS There is no judicial
precedent in Maryland authorizing abrogation of, revision or amendment to, a substantive element of the criminal common law.s 9
The Brown court alluded to the existence of judicial authority to
alter or abrogate a common law rule. "[U]nless changed by legislative
enactment or judicial decision,,,60 the inhabitants of Maryland are
entitled to the Maryland common law. The cases cited by the Brown
court fail, however, to support the proposition that criminal common
law rules can be changed by judicial decision. 6 1 Subsequent to this
early observation, the court made no further reference to judicial
prerogative for the abolition of the common law.
The Brown court's decision not to invoke judicial discretion is
defensible. In criminal law, where punishment by confinement exists,
the constitutional rights guaranteed to the offender demand the highest
protection. The only proper forum for any abolition or alteration of a
viable law belongs to the legislature. The Brown court ascribed to this
view:
When a court is abolishing a rule of law, it is submitted that
the proper exercise of judicial power should be explained and
supported by broad policies concerning the criminal law rather
than narrow determinations resting on very technical bases. The
aim and purpose of the criminal law is to provide adequate
protection for society and simultaneously assure justice for the

55.
56.
., 57.

58.
59.
60.
61.

of itself, reserve to the judiciary the omnipotent prerogative abolition. Ct. id. at 185-201,
166 A.2d at 512-20 (dissenting opinion).
5 Har. & J. 317 (1821); ct. Gilbert v. Findlay College, 195 Md. 508, 74 A.2d 36 (1950).
Md. ex rei. Weaver v. O'Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306, 311 (D. Md. 1956) .
Ct. Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
See, e.g., Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971), citing Schneider v.
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
See notes 60-61 infra.
21 Md. App. at 92, 318 A.2d at 258.
Of the two criminal cases cited by the court, McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 199 A.2d
229 (1963) (at common law, burgulary included church as a 'dwelling house') can be
cited only for the proposition that although occasion for use of the common law had not
occurred prior to July 4, 1776, such nonuse did not preclude its adoption on that date.
State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. 317 (1821) serves as the principle case for interpretation of
the Declaration of Rights.
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individual accused. A balance between the two requires a determination which necessarily varies with the environment and
background of the particular individual making the inquiry. For
this reason it seems that alteration or modification of the
criminal law (other than a mere procedural rule) should be by
the legislature where a more representative determination may
be made. 62
The Brown court relied upon three precepts in concluding that
abolition of the rule, if warranted, reposes in the legislature. While the
court recognized that "major advances have been made in medical
science and that improvements have been made in scientific crime
detection,,6 3 it declined to presume on this basis that the rule is no
longer realistic.64 Supportive of this posture the court also noted the
lower court's refusal to take judicial notice of such changes. 65 Second, the court considered the possibility that abolition. of the rule
might result in an imbalance between justice for the accused and the
adequate protection of society.6 6 Third, the court believed that there
remains a need to limit causation by some method. 6 7 The court's view·
that the legislative branch of government is the proper forum for
consideration of the rule does not terminate the issue. It merely shifts
the problem of resolving the issue to the legislature. Should the legislature act upon the year and a day rule and, if so, to what extent?
Various courses of action have been offered for solution and some have
been implemented by state legislatures. The legislature may adopt the
common law rule as a conclusive presumption,6 II it may modify the
rule, expanding the time span of the conclusive presumption,69 or, it
62. 21 Md. App. at 96, 318 A.2d at 261, quoting from Note, The Abolition of Year and A Day
Rule: Commonwealth v. Ladd, 65 DICK. L. REv. 166, 169 (1961). The court concluded that
"because expression and weighing of divergent views, consideration of potential effects,
and suggestion of adequate safeguards, are better suited to the legislative forum" any
change should be by the General Assembly. [d. (footnote omitted)
63. 21 Md. App. at 97, 318 A.2d at 26l.
64.ld.
65. The court quoted from the lower court's statement that it was "hesitant to take such judicial notice of a subject which clearly calls for complex expert evidence.... [lIt cannot
be definitely stated by this Court [Criminal Court of Baltimore J, in the absence of expert
testimony, that contemporary medical science is capable of establishing causstion after
the lapse of a year and a day" which evidence the State failed to produce. [d. at 98-99 n.ll,
318 A.2d at 262 n.ll.
66. ld. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261. See also text at note 62 supra.
67. [d.

68. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-458 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2210 (1964); COLO.·
REV. STAT. § 40-2-9 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:29 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.100
(1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-27 (1960).
69. CAL PENAL CODE § 194 (West 1969) (three years and a day); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. §
9.48.110 (1973) (three years and a day). The California court found a Constitutional question of the 'retroactivity' of the rule when confronted with the application of the 1969
legislative amendment which had extended the time span from a year and a day to three
years and a day, People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3rd 742, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1972)
(wherein a chiid died some twenty-one months after the infliction of the mortal wound. At
the time of the beating, California's PENAL CODE codified the year and a day rule. However, at the date of the child's death, statutory amendment had increased the rule to three
years and a day. The court held that because the amendment became effective several
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may refuse to consider the issue raised by the court and by its silence,
sanction the rule. 7 0 In addition, the legislatures of several states,
following the early lead of New York,71 have recently prepared and
adopted new penal laws and codes.72 The intent of these legislatures
has been to abolish the criminal common law, replacing it with a
statutory code. These codes purport to be all inclusive by codifying the
offenses creating, the defenses to, and the sentences for, crimes. As
witnessed in New York's Legeri and Brengard cases, however, the use of
a code which attempts to obviate ambiguity may necessitate resort to
appellate courts for clarification if the code fails to be all-inclusive.
The Maryland Legislature is provided with an opportunity to join
those jurisdictions which have adopted a criminal code. The State of
Maryland Commission on Criminal Law is presently preparing a
proposed Criminal Code for consideration by the Maryland Legislature. 7 3 To serve as the general model or basis for the proposed Criminal
Code, the Commissioners selected the New York Penal Law and
Code. 74 Neither the New York Penal Code nor the proposed Maryland
Code makes reference to the year and a day rule. Unlike the New York
Penal Code, the proposed Maryland Code abolishes all common law
offenses. 7s Probably through inadvertence, the Commissioners failed to
consider the year and a day rule. 76 However, § 10.05 of the proposed
Code provides that:
Undefined words or phrases in this Code, which are used at
common law or in statutes which are or have been in force in
this State and which have a judicially determined meaning in
the context in which they are used in this Code, shall be
construed in the light of such judicially determined meaning. 7 7

70.
71.

72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

months before the immunity of the prior statute had attached, the increased span in the
time requirement did not deprive defendants of a vested defense and thus did not contravene constitutional prescription against ex post facto laws.
See, e.g., Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d
1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1967); see note 31 supra.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 538-1 (1972); Code of Ga., tit. 26-1 (1972); ILL. ANN. STA'L,
Crim. Law and Proc. (1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 38, § 1 (1974); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.,
tit. 29, § 2901.01 (1974). A number of these codes have been based upon the NEW YORK
PENAL LAW AND CODE. In only one code is the year and a day rule mentioned specifically and
then only by a Note. The defmition of murder is "generally consistent.with the common law
definition of Murder, but defines the crime in non-technical terms and without adopting
the common law rule that for guilt the victim had to die within a year and a day from the
infliction of the fatal wound." Revision Commission Note, chap. 265, § 2, at p. 95 of the
PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE OF MASSACHUSET1'8 (1972) (effective January I, 1974).
STATE OF MARYLAND COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL LAw: PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE (June I,
1972) [hereinafter cited as PRoPOSED CRIMINAL CODE).
It should be noted ~t the Commissioners have made use of the MODERN PENAL CODE
where they have determined that it is more applicable to the 'Maryland situation. PR0POSED CRIMINAL CODE at viii.
PRoPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 1.10, at 2.
The Brown decision had not been handed down at the time the proposed code was published.
PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 10.05, at 31.
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Undoubtedly, the Commissioners intend that § 10.05 apply only to
those terms which appear directly in, but have not been defined by, the
code. An inaccurate application of § 10.05 coupled with the Brown
decision may provide some future defendant with an argument that
legislative caveat has resulted in the validity and viability of the year
and a day rule. Such an approach by a defendant may necessitate
consideration and interpretation of the proposed Code by the appellate
courts ending in a Maryland version of the Legeri and Brengard cases. 7 8
Further appellate deliberation on the year and a day rule need not
occur. The Commissioners and the Legislature have an opportunity to
'rectify the problem prior to adoption of the proposed Code. They may
follow the lead of the Massachusetts Legislature and by Commentary
declare that the year and a day rule is no longer applicable in Maryland. 7 9 While Commentary is expressive legislative intent, it is not law
and appellate debate may still ensue should a defendant raise the issue.
Therefore, should the Commissioners and the Legislature determine
that the correct conclusion is complete abolition of the rule with guilt
to be ascertained solely through a causal relationship, that position
should be so codified.
As an alternative, the Legislature may, as implied by the Brown
8
COurt, 0 determine that abolition is not warranted. If this approach is
adopted by the Legislature, the year and a day rule should be codified
to prevent resort to the appellate courts at a future date.
A third and more viable posture exists, which takes into account the
medical advances made in the 20th century, the protection of society,
and the accused's constitutional rights. The Legislature could expressly
enact a section which sanctions the rule that if the injured party does
not die within, for example three years and a day after the infliction of
the injury there is a rebuttable presumption that the infliction of the
injury was not the cause of death.81 The prosecution would still have
the burden of proving causation beyond a reasonable doubt. It is
unlikely that institution of a three-year rebuttable presumption would
place any greater obstacles in the prosecution's path when proving
causation. The approach would leave adjudication of causation to the
trier of the facts while reminding him that, if the injury did no~ result
in death within three years and a day, the presumption arises, which the
prosecution must overcome, that the decedent did not die of that
injury.
LucyA. Lowe
78. It should be noted that Marylljnd has no prior statutes incorporating the year and a day
rule. The New York courts relied heavily upon prior incorporation of the rule in the case
of murder by poison and the subsequent abolition by the legislature of that statute. The
Maryland courts will not be able to avail themselves of such reasoning should a version
of the Legeri and Brengard cases appear in this State. See note 31 supra.
79. See note 72 supra.
SO. See notes 63-67 supra.
81. The use of three years and a day is merely for illustrative purposes. A proper period of
limitation can only be ascertained after a thorough analysis by the legislature of medical
and scientific advancements.

